

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

OLC 75-2485/a

23 OCT 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Leonard L. Shupe, Chief
White House Correspondence Section
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: White House Correspondence Referral Re
Sam Adams and General Westmoreland

REFERENCE: Your Memorandum to Central Intelligence Agency,
Subject: White House Correspondence Referrals,
Dated 1 October 1975

Since the letter from Mrs. Roseanne C. Jones, forwarded to this Agency by reference, deals basically with General Westmoreland, it is felt that this matter is not within the jurisdiction of the Central Intelligence Agency. Therefore, we are returning Mrs. Jones' letter to you for further processing. Since former CIA analyst, Sam Adams, is also mentioned in the letter, we are attaching a fact sheet which you may use in any way you deem necessary.

SIGNED

George L. Cary
Legislative Counsel

Enclosures

cc: Mr. Frank Matthews
White House Central Files

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OSD REVIEW COMPLETED

GRG 12/17/2003



FACT SHEET

SAM ADAMS

In broad terms, Mr. Adams has charged that the Central Intelligence Agency deliberately suppressed Mr. Adams' views of enemy troop strength in South Vietnam, and conspired with elements of the Department of Defense to produce false and misleading, but politically acceptable, estimates of Vietnamese Communist strength.

These charges are not true.

During the period to which Mr. Adams has frequently referred, U. S. intelligence analysts of North Vietnamese and Viet Cong troop strength were continually confronted with the basic problem of fragmentary evidence. The evidence available consisted largely of captured Communist documents and the results of prisoner interrogations, augmented by informant and agent reports. Evidence which looked solid on first inspection was often much less solid than initial appearances would suggest. (Communist officials reporting to higher command echelons, for example, frequently exaggerated their accomplishments in developing guerrilla units, recruiting people for front groups or service units, etc.) Also, the evidence was inherently spotty. Hard information on Communist strength in several districts, for example, had to be assessed along with other information in determining the extent to which these districts were--or were not--representative of the approximately 235 districts in all of South Vietnam:

Given the state and nature of the evidence available, there were--inevitably--wide variations in the assessments or conclusions on this subject developed by professional U. S. intelligence officers. All of these conclusions had some evidentiary basis and none of them--including Mr. Adams'--was beyond legitimate professional argument.

By Mr. Adams' own account, his views could hardly have been considered suppressed. Indeed, he was afforded unusual opportunities to present them to his fellow analysts throughout the intelligence community and to the most senior officers in the CIA. In addition, Mr. Adams was able to expound his views during a number of major attempts to resolve the differences within the U. S. intelligence community regarding the size and strength of Communist forces in Vietnam. These attempts included interagency conferences held in Honolulu, Saigon and Washington, attended not only by representatives of the Washington intelligence community, but also by representatives of CINCPAC and MACV. Mr. Adams also presented his views to various members of the National Security Council Staff, to several Congressmen, and to members of the staffs of either individual Congressmen or various congressional committees.

Mr. Adams' research in fact made a real contribution to CIA knowledge of enemy strength in South Vietnam and the results of that research did much to raise the United States Government's estimates of that strength. Nonetheless, not all of Mr. Adams' conclusions were endorsed by his colleagues or superiors, not because his views were suppressed or regarded as politically unpalatable, but simply because the detailed expositions of his arguments were not all persuasive to his professional colleagues.

The Agency's assessments in the late 1960's were based in substantial measure on Mr. Adams' work and did argue the case for higher figures than those employed by MACV and the Defense Intelligence Agency. These CIA assessments were presented to the most senior officials of the United States Government, who were also apprised of the fact that there remained substantial differences of opinion within the intelligence community on these questions of Communist strength.

During 1968, two investigations were conducted within CIA to assess similar charges made at that time by Mr. Adams. These investigations concluded that Mr. Adams had every reasonable opportunity to present his views and argue them in great detail; that the Agency officers who did not accept all of his conclusions were acting in light of their best professional reading of the evidence available--which led them to conclusions at some variance with those of Mr. Adams--that the CIA officers and offices responsible for assessing the situation in Vietnam carried out their responsibility for producing unbiased intelligence assessments.

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

Memorandum

DDI-2612-7

TO : Central Intelligence Agency

DATE: 1 October 1975

FROM : Mr. Leonard L. Shupe³⁸³ / OX 56151
Chief, White House Correspondence Section, 3B-936, The Pentagon

SUBJECT: White House Correspondence Referrals

The attached letter addressed to the President was referred to the Department of Defense by the White House for a direct reply.

After review, it appears that the subject of the letter is under the jurisdiction of your office.

Attachment Letter from Mrs. Roseanne C. Jones, 2924 Westminister Circle, N. E., Atlanta, Georgia 30327, dated 21 Sept 75.

cc: White House Central Files
Attn: Mr. Frank Matthews
Rm. 68, Exec. Ofc. Building
Washington, D. C.

Rosanne C. Jones

STAT

Sept 21, 1975

The President

Washington, D.C.

TO DOD - FOR APPROPRIATE HANDLING
DATE SEP 26 1975

Dear Mr. Ford:

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Pest
I was very interested in the testimony Mr. Sam Adams gave the other day before a Congressional committee regarding the deception as to the troop strength of the enemy during the Viet Nam war. I was particularly interested in what he had to say regarding General Westmoreland.

General Westmoreland's conduct of the war left a great deal to be desired and I have always felt he was responsible for My Lai and other incidents of this type that probably have not been brought to the attention of John Q public.

Please have Mr. Sam Adams testimony checked out and if he has his facts straight as our Commander in Chief, I urge you to have charges preferred against General Westmoreland for his dereliction of duty in his conduct and loss of the Viet Nam war. He should be court martialed.

I realize you have the workload of ten men, but I prefer a "no reply" to a form letter.

Please wear your bullet-proof vest in crowds.

Sincerely,

Mrs Rosanne C. Jones
Mrs. Rosanne C. Jones

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